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By JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD, CHARLES R. PLOTT, AND TOMOMI TANAKA∗
Price controls are one of the most common
forms of market intervention by regulatory au-
thorities. Price setting was a central duty of the
Civil Aeronautics Board until the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act of 1978. The Dairy Price Support
Program sets a minimal price for milk and other
dairy products in the United States. Price caps
for pharmaceutical drugs are a pervasive form
of government intervention in Europe. And
minimum wage laws set a price floor for labor
throughout the developed world.
A great deal of empirical work suggests that
price controls induce quality-based competition
between sellers.1 However, competitive equi-
libria often fail to exist when price controls are
present, and hence theoretical analysis of the ef-
fects of price controls has proven difficult. In
particular, this lack of a theoretical foundation
undermines our ability to understand how price
controls may induce changes in product quality.
As an example, consider the case where there
are two sellers and one buyer, and two quali-
∗ Hatfield: Graduate School of Business, Stanford Uni-
versity, 655 Knight Way, Stanford CA 94305 (e-mail: hat-
field@stanford.edu). Plott: Division of the Humanities
and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology,
1200 East California Boulevard, Pasadena CA 91125 (email:
cplott@hss.caltech.edu). Tanaka: School of Politics and Global
Studies, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 873902, Tempe,
AZ 85287 (email: tomomi.tanaka@asu.edu). We thank Marcus
Berliant, Clayton Featherstone, Scott Duke Kominers, Muriel
Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Nilanjan Roy, William Zame and sem-
inar participants at Boston College, the 2009 Lee Center Work-
shop at Caltech, Harvard Business School, and New York Uni-
versity for helpful discussions. The financial support of the Gor-
don and Betty Moore Foundation and the support of the Caltech
Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political Science are
gratefully acknowledged. Hatfield appreciates the hospitality of
Harvard Business School, and Tanaka appreciates the hospitality
of University of Tokyo, which hosted them during parts of this
research.
1See Plott (1965) for an analysis of non-price competition by
regulated dry cleaners, Douglas and Miller III (1974) for an anal-
ysis of non-price competition by airlines, and Joskow (1980) for
an analysis of non-price competition by hospitals. Hashimoto
(1982) and Neumark and Wascher (2001) investigate whether
minimum wage laws affect job charateristics, particularly on-
the-job training.
ties, H and L. The buyer has unit demand, and
values a high quality good at 10, while valu-
ing the low quality good at 8. Each seller has
unit supply, with the low cost seller having a
cost of production of 1 for a low quality good
and 6 for a high quality good, and the high cost
seller having a cost of production of 2 for a low
quality good and 7 for a high quality good. In
any competitive equilibrium, the low cost seller
sells to the buyer the low quality good at a price
p(L) ∈ [1, 2], with the price of the (untraded)
high quality good being in the interval p(H) ∈
[p(L) + 2, p(L) + 5]. However, if a price floor
of 5 is imposed for all qualities, then no com-
petitive equilibrium exists, as both sellers will
demand to sell since the price of the low quality
good is at least 5.
However, a stable outcome exists regard-
less of the existence of the price floor. In
the case without the price floor, we know that
any stable outcome induces the same allocation
as the competitive equilibrium (Hatfield et al.,
2012b). When the price floor of 5 is present,
our Theroem 3 demonstrates that in any stable
outcome the low cost seller sells the high qual-
ity good to the buyer at a price in the interval
[6, 7]. This example demonstrates that a price
floor may induce quality competition between
sellers, and furthermore may reduce total social
surplus.2
More generally, in this work we consider two-
sided markets with price controls as a special
case of the two-sided matching with contracts
model.3 Hatfield et al. (2012b) showed that,
when price controls are not present, the set
of competitive equilibria naturally correspond
2Indeed, in this example, all three agents are weakly worse
off.
3Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) first developed the match-
ing with contracts model, building on the work of Kelso and
Crawford (1982); the possibility of such a generalization was
first noted in remarks by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso
and Crawford (1982). Klaus and Walzl (2009) and Hatfield and
Kominers (2012) extended this work to the setting of many-to
many matching with contracts.
1
2 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MONTH YEAR
to the set of stable outcomes. We develop a
model of quality competition and show, using
techniques developed by Echenique and Oviedo
(2006) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012, Forth-
coming), that the set of stable outcomes is non-
empty even when price controls are imposed.
Furthermore, the model exhibits quality-based
competition induced by price controls: for a
price floor, sellers compete by offering ineffi-
ciently high quality goods, while when a price
ceiling is introduced, buyers compete by accept-
ing inefficiently low quality goods.
I. The Quality Competition Model
A. Framework
There is a finite set of unit demand buyers B,
a finite set of unit supply sellers S, and a finite
set of qualities Q, where the set Q is a finite set
of consecutive integers {qmin, . . . , qmax}. The
set of trades is defined as Ω ≡ B × S ×Q. For
each trade (b, s, q) = ω ∈ Ω, we let b(ω) ≡ b,
s(ω) ≡ s, and q(ω) ≡ q. For a set of trades
Ψ ⊆ Ω, we let Ψb ≡ {ψ ∈ Ψ : b = b(ψ)} for
each b ∈ B and Ψs ≡ {ψ ∈ Ψ : s = s(ψ)} for
each s ∈ S. A set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω is feasible if
each agent is associated with at most one trade,
i.e., |Ψb| ≤ 1 for all b ∈ B and |Ψs| ≤ 1 for all
s ∈ S.
The set of contracts is defined as X ≡ Ω×R.
For a contract x = (ω, pω), we let b(x) ≡ b(ω),
s(x) ≡ s(ω), q(x) ≡ q(ω), and p(x) ≡ pω.
We let Yb ≡ {y ∈ Y : b = b(y)} for each
b ∈ B and Ys ≡ {y ∈ Y : s = s(y)} for
each s ∈ S. A set of contracts Y ⊆ X is an
outcome if each agent is associated with at most
one contract, i.e., |Yb| ≤ 1 for all b ∈ B and
|Ys| ≤ 1 for all s ∈ S.
The utility for a feasible set of trades for a
buyer b ∈ B is given by
ub(Ψ) ≡
{
f b + v(q(ψ)) if ∃ψ ∈ Ψb
0 otherwise.
where f b ∈ R denotes the value b obtains
from procuring a good, while v(q) is a concave
function denoting the additional utility b obtains
from procuring a good of quality q. This induces
a utility function over outcomes for b of
U b(Y ) ≡
{
f b + v(q(y))− p(y) if ∃y ∈ Yb
0 otherwise.
Similarly, the utility for a feasible set of trades
for a seller s is given by
us(Ψ) ≡
{
−cs − e(q(ψ)) if ∃ψ ∈ Ψs
0 otherwise.
where cs ∈ R denotes the cost s incurs from
producing a good, while e(q) is a convex func-
tion denoting the additional cost s incurs from
producing a good of quality q. This induces a
utility function over outcomes for s of
U s(Y ) ≡
{
p(y)− cs − v(q(y)) if ∃y ∈ Ys
0 otherwise.
Finally, for simplicity, we assume that there is
a unique quality qˆ < qmax that maximizes the
surplus v(q) − e(q); note that the assumptions
on the utility function then imply that surplus
is increasing with quality for all qualities below
qˆ, and decreasing with quality for all qualities
above qˆ.
B. Efficiency and Stability
An outcome A is efficient if it solves
A ∈ arg max
Y⊆X
∑
i∈B∪S
U i(Y ).
It is straightforward that for any efficient out-
come A, for each x ∈ A, q(x) = qˆ.
The utility function for each agent induces a
choice correspondence
Ci(Y ) ≡ arg max
Z⊆Yi
U i(Z)
for each i ∈ B ∪ S.
An outcome A ⊆ X is stable if it is
1) Individually rational: for all i ∈ B ∪ S,
Ai ∈ Ci(A).
2) Unblocked: there does not exist a
nonempty blocking set Z ⊆ X such that
a) Z ∩A = ∅, and
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b) for all i ∈ B ∪ S, if Zi 6= ∅, then
Zi ⊆ Y i for all Y i ∈ Ci(Z ∪A).
Stability is closely related to the idea of com-
petitive equilibrium: Intuitively, for an alloca-
tionA to be unblocked, for each contract x /∈ A,
it must be the case that either b(x) or s(x) re-
jects x. If so, for each agent i we can consider
his “budget set” as the union ofAi and the set of
contracts he rejects. Hence, stability insists that
each agent chooses optimally from this “budget
set”, which is analogous to the notion of indi-
vidual maximization from competitive equilib-
rium. Furthermore, market clearing is satisfied,
as a contract x is demanded by the buyer b(x)
if and only if it is demanded by the seller s(x).
Hatfield et al. (2012b) make this notion precise,
showing that a natural correspondence between
competitive equilibria and stable outcomes ex-
ists in our setting when no price controls are im-
posed.
Furthermore, in this setting the set of stable
outcomes is equivalent to the core. This equiv-
alence non longer holds in settings with multi-
unit supply sellers and multi-unit demand buy-
ers.
C. Equilibrium
We begin by considering the case where only
contracts in X(q) ≡ {x ∈ X : q(x) = q} are
available, but no price controls are present. In
that case, A is a stable outcome if and only if
A ∈ arg max
Y⊆X(q)
∑
i∈B∪S
U i(Y );(1)
that is, A maximizes surplus given the contrac-
tual set available.
Furthermore, every contract will trade at the
same price p. The price p must be larger than
pminB (q) ≡ max
b∈Brb(Y )
f b + v(q)
so that each buyer with unmet demand does not
wish to buy a good, and
pminS (q) ≡ max
s∈s(Y )
cs + e(q)
so that each seller currently engaged in
trade wishes to do so; we let pmin(q) ≡
max{pminB (q), pminS (q)}. Analogously, the price
p must be smaller than
pmaxB (q) ≡ min
b∈b(Y )
f b + v(q)
so that each buyer currently engaged in trade
wishes to do so, and
pmaxS (q) ≡ min
s∈Srs(Y )
cs + e(q)
so that each seller not currently producing does
not wish to supply a good; we let pmax(q) ≡
min{pmaxB (q), pmaxS (q)}.
We formalize these results in Theorem 1;
proofs of this and other stated results are a
special case of results found in Hatfield et al.
(2012a).
THEOREM 1: For the contractual set X(q),
a stable outcome exists, any stable outcome A
solves (1), and each contract x ∈ A has p(x) ∈
[pmin(q), pmax(q)].
It is now straightforward to characterize the
set of equilibria for the contractual set X .
THEOREM 2: For the contractual set X , the
set of stable outcomes is the same as that given
in Theorem 1 for the quality qˆ.
Hence, in the absence of price controls, any sta-
ble outcome will be efficient. In particular, only
the efficient quality will trade. To see this, sup-
pose that y ∈ A for some outcome A and that
q(y) 6= qˆ. Now consider x such that b(x) =
b(y), s(x) = s(y), q(x) = qˆ and
p(x) = p(y) + (v(qˆ)− v(q(ψ)))− 
for some small  > 0. Then {x} is a blocking
set, as x will clearly be chosen by b(x), and also
by s(x) since
v(qˆ)− v(q(ψ))−  > c(qˆ)− c(q(ψ))
for  sufficiently small, as qˆ is the unique effi-
cient quality.
We now consider the case where a price floor
of pf is imposed, that is, the set of contracts is
given by X[pf ] ≡ {x ∈ X : p(x) ≥ pf}.
In this case, stable outcomes may no longer be
efficient, as the supply of goods of quality qˆ ex-
ceeds the demand. Hence, quality may adjust
upward to compensate. When the price floor is
just above pmax(qˆ), trade of both the efficient
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quality qˆ and the inefficient quality qˆ + 1 may
be observed; the efficient quality good will trade
at the price floor pf , while qˆ + 1 quality goods
will trade at pf+(v(qˆ+1)−v(qˆ)). Trades of the
inefficiently high quality good are not blocked at
this price, as any blocking contract would have
a price lower than the price floor. Finally, when
pf > p
max(qˆ + 1) − (v(qˆ + 1) − v(qˆ)), all
trade at the efficient quality will cease, as sellers
will compete away the gains from trading the ef-
ficient quality good by offering buyers more at-
tractive contracts for the inefficient quality good;
hence, only quality qˆ+1 goods will be traded in
equilibrium.
THEOREM 3: Consider the contractrual set
X[pf ]. A stable outcome exists. There are three
cases:
1) pf < pmin(qˆ): Then any stable outcome is
as in Theorem 2.
2) pmax(qˆ) < pf < pmin(qˆ+1)− [v(qˆ+1)−
v(qˆ)]: Then in any stable outcome A, for
each x ∈ A either
• q(x) = qˆ and p(x) = pf , or
• q(x) = qˆ+1 and p(x) = pf+(v(qˆ+
1)− v(qˆ)).
and the set of buyers engaging in trade is
an element of
arg max
Bˆ⊆B
∑
b∈Bˆ
(
f b + v(qˆ)− pf
) .
3) pmax(qˆ + 1) − [v(qˆ + 1) − v(qˆ)] < pf <
pmin(qˆ+1): Then any stable outcome is as
in Theorem 1 for the contract setX(qˆ+1).
Price floors induce inefficiency in three ways:
First, there is too little trade, since some welfare
enhancing trades require a price below the price
floor to be individually rational. Second, trade
may be at an inefficient quality, since a mutually
advantageous switch to a more efficient quality
requires the price to drop below the price floor.
Finally, the wrong agents may trade, as supply
is greater than demand; a more efficient pro-
ducer can not undercut a less efficient producer
on price if the price is already at the price floor.4
4The results of this theorem can be extended to any price
floor, as well as to price ceilings. See Hatfield et al. (2012a).
II. Conclusion
The model presented here that makes specific
predictions of market equilibrium in settings
with price controls. In Hatfield et al. (2012a),
we have generalized the results here to the case
of multi-unit demand. Moreover, we report on
a series of experiments of continuous time, dou-
ble auction markets with mutiple qualities; for
each experiment, we impose a price control that
corresponds to either part 2 or part 3 of Theo-
rem 3. The experimental results are very close
to the predictions of the theory: When the price
floor falls within the regime of part 2 of Theo-
rem 3, agents trade both qualities, with the ef-
ficient quality good being traded at the price
floor and the inefficiently high quality good be-
ing traded at a price reflecting a buyer’s dif-
ference in valuation between the two qualities.
When the price floor is higher, and falls within
the regime of part 3 of Theorem 3, agents trade
only the high quality good, and do so at a price
as if that quality were the only quality available.
Furthermore, in both cases, the quantity traded
falls within the interval predicted by Theorem 3.
Analogous results are obtained when price ceil-
ings are imposed.
Stability is a robust solution concept which
generalizes the concept of competitive equilib-
rium in settings with transferrable utility. In this
work, we show that stable outcomes exist even
in settings with price controls, while competi-
tive equilibria do not. This suggests that stabil-
ity may be helpful in understanding the effects
of other market interventions. For instance, in
settings with quotas (such as import restrictions
on certain goods), competitive equilibria fail to
exist; however, stable outcomes do exist in such
settings, and hence matching theory allows us
to make sharp predictions.5 We conjecture that
there may be other settings where stability pro-
vides sharp equilibrium predictions even though
competitive equilibria fail to exist.
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